The Myth of Libertarian Free Will
According to theopedia.com, “libertarian freedom is, therefore, the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition and greatest desires.”
This is my daughter, Lydia. She recently turned three years old and is the apple of her daddy’s eye. I would die for Lydia.
Mr. Libertarian-Free-Will-Man, riddle me this: Am I “free” to murder Lydia? When I get home from work early this morning and Lydia lies sleeping in her bed, will I be “free” to suffocate her?
(A note before answering this question: There are no unusual internal or external forces acting upon me or this situation. In other words, assume that I am as sane as I am most mornings, and there are no terrorists compelling me to kill Lydia in lieu of a nuclear bomb being detonated in downtown Minneapolis.)
Under normal circumstances, in what meaningful way am I “free” to murder Lydia? How is it that I can be 100% certain I will not murder Lydia when I arrive home this morning? The proponent of Libertarian Free Will must hold that I am “free” to murder Lydia this morning, and therefore cannot be certain of my sparing her.
This has seemed to me for some time to be absurd on its face. I am certainly not free to murder Lydia. I am not free to do that which I have no desire to do. I am not free to plunge the Sharpie lying within my reach on this desk into my eye socket. I am not free to arrive at work this evening in the buff. Am I physically capable of doing all of the above? Of course, I am, but we are speaking here of moral freedom, not corporal capacity.
I am physically capable of doing all sorts of things I will never do, because I do not wish to do them. So, in what sense am I truly “free” to do these things? I would submit that I am not free, at least not in a libertarian sense, to murder Lydia or do anything I do not desire to do. I believe I am free to act according to my nature, desires and inclinations.
So, Mr. Libertarian-Free-Will-Man, am I free to murder Lydia? If yes, how so? If no, well… then I think we are nearing a more biblical view of human will and freedom, and facilitating a more biblical (and rational) discussion of God’s foreknowledge and election…
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I think I understand what you’re saying here and generally agree, but I think the issue is more complicated. Take for example the addict, is it not the addicts nature to continue in their addiction? And yet some overcome that desire and live sober lives. I don’t think we can simplify the human psyche to being of one ‘nature’ or having independent ‘desires’ that don’t interact. The addict desires to continue doing drugs, the successfully recovered addict clearly has two desires, or two natures; the one that wants drugs and the one that wants the things sober life brings. It seems to me that while what you say is essentially true, that humans are bound by their desires and nature, free will still exists in the many conflicts between two or more natures or desires.
This may seem a small issue, but I think most of our important choices (those that we actually think out) involve these conflicting desires, and thus we find free will in all but the most extreme cases. Could you indiscriminately kill Lydia? Of course you could, but would you? Obviously not, you love Lydia and have no desire to visit harm upon her. Would you, on the other hand, spank her? I think so, and am sure you do; you desire then to avoid causing her pain, but you also desire to discipline her so that she may be successful in the future. You choose to spank her then, despite your desire not to harm her. I think this is how most of us make choices.
John,
I would say that a person always does what he wants or is inclined to do, even when multiple desires/inclinations are involved. A person will always do what he most wants to do.
Example: Al Qaeda has Lydia hostage and threatens to kill her if I don’t detonate a nuclear device at the Mall Of America. Whichever decision I make will be the decision I most desire to make. If I detonate the device, it is because I value Lydia’s life more than I value the lives of all those at the MOA. My decision is still bound to my desires.
“Could you indiscriminately kill Lydia? Of course you could, but would you? Obviously not, you love Lydia and have no desire to visit harm upon her.”
I think you prove my point here. How can you say, “Obviously not?” If my will is truly “free”, then you cannot be certain I won’t kill Lydia. Yet, you are (rightly) certain I won’t. Why? Because, there is nothing in me that desires to kill Lydia. When you say , “Of course you could,” I think you are referring to my physical ability to overpower and kill Lydia. That is not the point, however. We are talking about moral freedom, not physical ability.
God Bless
Where God has worked the most in me is understanding his providence in daily, moment-by-moment events, those I might perceive as good or bad. He has grown me in this area and I am thankful. The topic is a theological one I had never spent much time probing and seeking to come to a biblical worldview of concurrence is exciting (i.e., the relationship between God’s providential decrees that govern our loves and our willing choices).
I am coming to understand that in some mysterious way God actually influences our wills, yet in such a way that we remain responsible for the good or evil we do. It’s a fascinating subject and one that I think I will be delving into for all of 2008 and beyond. As I am reading Scripture I can now see the understanding of concurrence among biblical characters who attributed everything that happened to them as God’s providential work. (e.g., Abraham, Jacob, Isaac, Joseph, etc.–starting with Genesis this month these come to mind). I think the bottom line is that we really have far less ‘control’ over the course of our live than we think.
In his systematic theology text Wayne Grudem likens God’s concurrence to a Shakespearian play, Macbeth. In the story Macbeth murders King Duncan. The question may be asked, “Who killed King Duncan?” On one level the correct answer is Macbeth, he was totally responsible for the evil deed. The reality that Macbeth killed the king is 100% true. But, on another level when we ask the question, “Who killed King Duncan?”, William Shakespeare is the killer because he wrote the play and the scene where Macbeth kill the king. So we can see that Shakespeare is 100% responsible for killing the king. So in answer to the question of who killed the king both answers are equally true. How weird is that? Somehow God guides and directs human wills to fulfill his eternal purposes. And yet at the same time whether we do good or evil we remain responsible for our actions (e.g., Pharaoh hindering Israel from leaving Egypt).